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Summary: The right to paid annual leave is a particularly important 
principle of EU social law that is regulated by the provisions of Article 
7 of the Working Time Directive (WTD), where it enjoys a privileged 
status as the only non-derogable right. Significantly, Article 7 of the 
WTD Directive has been interpreted by the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union (CJEU) as a directly effective provision. In Croatian law, 
this right has been implemented by means of the Labour Act. In this 
article, we examine three aspects of national regulations regarding 
paid annual leave against which might raise doubts as to the proper 
implementation of Article 7 WTD. First, we look at the regulation on 
minimum periods of employment as a precondition for the entitlement 
to paid annual leave. Here, we shall argue that the national regulation 
is not consistent with EU law, as it triggers the accrual of the right to 
paid annual leave only after half a month of employment. After that, 
we examine the regulation on the overlap between paid annual leave 
and other types of leave. We shall claim that national rules regulating 
overlaps between paid annual leave and maternity, parental, adop-
tion, sick and other paid leave are not in violation of EU law. However, 
in the case of the overlap between paid leave and unpaid leave stem-
ming from the Maternity and Parental Benefits Act, we raise certain 
doubts as to the adequacy of national regulations. Our last point of 
interest is the regulation concerning the carrying-over of untaken paid 
annual leave into the following calendar year, where we argue that 
national provisions on the carry-over period are not consistent with 
Article 7 WTD. 
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1. Introduction
The right to paid annual leave is one of the cornerstones of labour 
regulations on working time. Originally linked to the protection of the 
health and well-being of workers to help them to be more productive,1 
this right was recognised for the first time at the international level in 
the 1936 International Labour Organization (ILO) Holidays with Pay 
Convention,2 and is now included in all major international human rights 
documents,3 as well as being enshrined in the national legislation of all 
Member States of the EU. Concomitantly, its pivotal nature has been 
acknowledged by European Union (EU) law. With its formal legal basis 
in the health and safety provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU),4 the right to paid annual leave is regulated 
by Article 7 of the Working Time Directive 2003/885 (WTD), which pro-
vides entitlement to a minimum of four weeks of paid annual leave6 for 
every worker in all sectors of activity, public or private.7 This minimum 
period may only be replaced by payment in lieu when the employment 
relationship is terminated. Importantly, this right enjoys a privileged sta-
tus as the only non-derogable right regulated by the WTD. In addition, 
the right to paid annual leave is mentioned in the Community Charter of 
the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers8 and in the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the EU,9 and is recognised as a right on its own by both 
documents, the latter linking it to the notion of solidarity. According to 
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU or Court), the right to paid annual 
1 ILO, ‘Working Time in the Twenty-first Century’ (Report for discussion at the Tripartite 
Meeting of Experts on Working Time Arrangements, Geneva, 17-21 October 2011) 15.
2 Convention no 52 concerning Annual Holidays with Pay (adopted 24 June 1936, entered 
into force 22 September 1939), revised by Convention no 132 concerning Annual Holidays 
with Pay (adopted 24 June 1970, entered into force 30 June 1973).
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) 
(UDHR) art 24; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 
16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) (ICESCR), art 7(d); European Social 
Charter 1961, art 2, point 3; European Social Charter 1996 (revised), art 2, point 3. 
4 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2010] 
OJ C 83/01, art 153. At the time of the adoption of the WTD, art 153 TFEU was EC Treaty 
(Treaty of Rome, as amended) art 137.
5 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 
2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [2003] OJ L229/9. 
6 Member States are allowed to provide for a paid annual leave of longer duration. See, for 
example, Case C-342/01 Merino Gómez [2004] ECR I-02605, para 43. They are also allowed 
to provide for the entitlement to paid annual leave under national law to vary according to 
the reason for a worker’s absence on health grounds, provided that the entitlement is al-
ways equal to or exceeds the minimum period of four weeks of paid annual leave. See Case 
C-282/10 Dominguez [2012] ECR I-000, para 49.
7 WTD, art 1(3). 
8 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, European File 6/90, 
May 1992, art 8.
9 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ 83/02, art 31. 
161CYELP 10 [2014] 159-187
leave is ‘a particularly important principle of [EU] social law ... whose 
implementations by the competent national authorities must be confined 
within the limits expressly laid down’10 by the WTD. 
Despite its recognition as a fundamental social right, the effect of EU 
law provisions on paid annual leave is to an extent limited from the per-
spective of the individual worker if he/she is precluded from exercising 
the Article 7 WTD right to paid annual leave due to a conflicting provision 
of national law. Namely, in the case of a conflicting provision of national 
law, the effect of Article 7 WTD on individual employment relationships 
depends on the type of employer. In vertical situations, when the em-
ployer is a state body, a national judge has to set aside the conflicting 
provision of national law, applying directly Article 7(1) WTD to the indi-
vidual employment relationship.11 Accordingly, a worker is able to rely on 
it directly, since Article 7(1) WTD fulfils the conditions to produce direct 
effect.12 In horizontal situations between private parties, however, the 
effect of Article 7(1) WTD is qualified. As the directives are not capable 
of producing horizontal direct effect, individual workers cannot directly 
invoke Article 7(1) WTD against an employer who is a private entity.13 In 
this case, a national judge has the duty to apply and interpret national 
law, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 7 
WTD in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter.14 If such an in-
terpretation is not possible, the individual worker is effectively precluded 
from claiming the right to (paid annual) leave and can only obtain com-
pensation for the loss sustained.15 
The described discrepancy caused by the lack of horizontal direct 
effect of directives demonstrates that the provisions of EU law cannot 
unequivocally substitute conflicting national provisions on paid annual 
leave. This, in turn, puts an additional emphasis on the implementation 
of Article 7 WTD in national law. Therefore, in this paper we will examine 
the Croatian legislation on paid annual leave against the background of 
EU law. Three aspects of national legislation which might raise doubts 
as to the proper implementation of Article 7 WTD in Croatian law will 
be examined. Our first point of interest will be the regulation on mini-
mum periods of employment as a precondition for the entitlement to paid 
10 Case C-173/99 BECTU [2001] ECR I-4881, para 43.
11 Dominguez (n 6) paras 38-39, 41.
12 Dominguez (n 6) para 34.
13 Dominguez (n 6) para 42.
14 Dominguez (n 6) paras 24-25, 27. The application and interpretation of national law is 
limited by general principles of law and cannot serve as a basis for an interpretation of na-
tional law contra legem. See Dominguez (n 6) para 27.
15 Dominguez (n 6) para 43.
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annual leave. We will look at whether Article 59(2) of the Labour Act,16 
which regulates the calculation of the proportional time of paid annual 
leave, contravenes Article 7 WTD to the extent that it triggers the accrual 
of the right to paid annual leave only after half a month of employment. 
In the section that follows, we will examine the relationship between paid 
annual leave and other periods of leave. We will start by focusing on 
the overlap between paid annual leave, sick leave and maternity leave 
respectively, as these have been examined by the CJEU. After that, we 
will examine whether the principle that paid annual leave should not 
overlap with sick leave and maternity leave can be applicable to other 
types of leave recognised by national law but not yet challenged before 
the CJEU. The last section will be devoted to the carrying-over of untaken 
paid annual leave into the following calendar year. Here, we will look into 
the national provisions on the carry-over period, raising the issue of its 
length. In our concluding remarks, we will suggest how Croatian law can 
be brought into conformity with EU law. 
2. Minimum period of employment as a precondition for entitlement 
to paid annual leave
2.1 The EU law perspective
The question of whether conditioning the right to paid annual leave 
to a certain period of uninterrupted employment is in accordance with 
Article 7 WTD was put forward for the first time in the BECTU17 case. 
Under the relevant UK legislation, the entitlement to paid annual leave 
did not arise until a worker was continuously employed for 13 weeks with 
the same employer. Since most of BECTU’s members were on short-term 
contracts, many of them did not satisfy this condition. Accordingly, they 
were deprived of any entitlement to paid annual leave and of any right to 
allowance in lieu merely because, although they worked on a regular ba-
sis, they did so for successive employers.18 The CJEU made a distinction 
between ‘the entitlement of every worker to paid annual leave’ as a ‘par-
ticularly important principle of [EU] social law from which there can be 
no derogation and whose implementation by the competent national au-
thorities must be confined within the limits expressly laid down’19 by the 
WTD and the conditions of exercising that right. Although, the WTD left 
the regulation of the conditions for entitlement and the granting of the 
entitlement to paid annual leave to the Member States, the CJEU stated 
16 Zakon o radu (Labour Act), Narodne novine (Official Gazette), 149/09, 61/11, 82/12, 
73/13. 
17 BECTU (n 10). 
18 BECTU (n 10) para 27.
19 BECTU (n 10) para 43.
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that this regulation must be ‘construed as referring only to the arrange-
ments20 for paid annual leave adopted in the various Member States’.21 
Consequently, the Member States are not allowed to ‘adopt national rules 
under which a worker does not begin to accrue rights to paid annual 
leave until [he/she] has completed a minimum period’ of employment,22 
and so the contested UK legislation was not compatible with the WTD.
This basic idea that the accrual of the right to paid annual leave 
cannot be conditioned by a minimum period of employment was fur-
ther developed in the Schultz-Hoff and Stringer23 and Dominguez24 cases. 
Both cases will be amply examined in the sections which follow. Here, it 
is sufficient to say that in the first case the appellants in the main pro-
ceedings were unable to take paid annual leave within a certain period 
of time provided by national legislation because they were on sick leave. 
In the second case, national legislation made the entitlement to paid an-
nual leave conditional on a minimum of ten days’ (or one month’s) actual 
work during the reference period. Consequently, Ms Dominguez was re-
fused her right to paid annual leave because she was on sick leave the 
whole reference year. In Schultz-Hoff and Stringer, the Court stated that 
the WTD, in relation to paid annual leave, does not distinguish between 
workers on sick leave and those who actually worked in the course of 
that year. As both groups of workers are covered by the WTD, the CJEU 
concluded that Member States cannot condition the right to paid annual 
leave by the obligation to have actually worked during the course of the 
year in which the leave had to be taken. In Schultz-Hoff and Stringer, the 
applicant was not able to take the already accrued paid annual leave 
because he was on sick leave, ie a period of time in which he did not 
perform any actual work. The Dominguez case was more straightforward, 
because the applicant was prevented from accruing paid annual leave. 
In other words, she did not have any entitlement to it. Here the Court, 
combining BECTU and Schultz-Hoff and Stringer, went one step further 
by saying that Article 7(1) WTD must be interpreted as ‘precluding na-
tional provisions or practices which make entitlement to paid annual 
leave conditional on a minimum period of ten days’ or one month’s actual 
work during the reference period’.25
20 According to Ricci, those would be, for example ‘planning of the periods, the worker’s 
obligation to give advance notice to the employer of the intended leave period, the possibility 
to require a minimum period of work before leave can be taken, criteria for proportionate 
calculation of annual leave in cases where the relationships lasts less than one year’. G 
Ricci, ‘BECTU: An Unlimited Right to Annual Paid Leave’ [2001] 30(4) Industrial Law Jour-
nal 401, 405.
21 BECTU (n 10) para 53.
22 BECTU (n 10) para 53.
23 Cases C-350/06 and C-520/06 Schultz-Hoff and Stringer [2009] ECR I-179.
24 Dominguez (n 6). 
25 Dominguez (n 6) para 21.
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A discussion on the accrual of paid annual leave would not be com-
plete without mentioning cases which seem to open the possibility of 
justifying the provisions of national law which condition the entitlement 
of the right to paid annual leave to a certain period of employment or ac-
tual work. The CJEU seemed to find justification in other EU legislation. 
In the Tirols26 case, it invoked the Framework Agreement on Fixed Term 
Work,27 which is based on the principle of non-discrimination between 
fixed-term and permanent workers, and which at the same time allows 
for the principle of pro rata temporis to be applicable, when appropriate.28 
According to the latter principle, it is possible to differently calculate the 
rights of fixed-term workers by reference to the duration of their contract, 
provided that this is done on objective grounds. In Tirols, however, the 
CJEU found that a provision of Austrian law which excluded workers 
working less than a maximum of six months or on a casual basis from 
accruing the right to paid annual leave could not be kept, as it was not 
justified on objective grounds. The justification given by the Austrian 
Government, namely that the contested provision served as a stimulation 
for employment, did not respond to a genuine need, and was not appro-
priate for achieving the objective pursued or necessary for that purpose. 
It was a mere budgetary consideration which could thus not justify dis-
crimination.29 
A similar reasoning was invoked in Heimann and Toltschin,30 albeit 
with reference to the Framework Agreement on Part-Time Work31 and 
with a different outcome. In this case, the CJEU examined a provision 
of a social plan agreed between an employer and a works council which 
enabled the extension of employment contracts for dismissed workers by 
‘zero-hours short time working’. Under this arrangement, the dismissed 
workers had the opportunity of receiving, in the year following their dis-
missal, a financial allowance from the state. However, as all the rights 
and obligations from the employment relationship were suspended, the 
applicants did not acquire any rights to paid annual leave for that year. 
Even though the arrangement was considered, from a formal point of 
view, a full-time employment contract of a limited duration, due to the 
zero-time work the CJEU regarded the workers as ‘temporary part-time 
workers’. As the workers were suspended from working under an ar-
rangement which gave them time to rest and resort to leisure activities, 
26 Case C-486/08 Tirols [2010] ECR I-03527.
27 Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on 
fixed term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP [1999] OJ L175/43.
28 Council Directive 1999/70/EC (n 27) clause 4.
29 Tirols (n 26) paras 44-46.
30 Cases C-229/11 and C-230/11 Heimann and Toltschin [2012] ECR I-000.
31 Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the framework agreement 
on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC [1998] OJ L14/9.
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and given that the purpose of the arrangement worked for the financial 
benefit of the workers, the CJEU found the social plan to be a proper 
application of the pro rata temporis principle and not in violation of the 
principle of non-discrimination of part-time and full-time workers envis-
aged by the Framework Agreement on Part-Time Work. Consequently, 
the CJEU did not find the social plan incompatible with Article 7 WTD.
To sum up, following the CJEU ruling in BECTU, it is necessary 
to distinguish between the entitlement to paid annual leave, which 
cannot be negated by reference to national legislation and/or practice, 
and conditions of exercising that right, which can be determined by 
national law and/or practice. Entitlement to paid annual leave cannot 
be conditioned by either minimum periods of employment (BECTU) or a 
minimum period of actual work during the reference period (Dominguez). 
However, after Tirols and Heimann and Toltschin, it is clear that in con-
tracts of limited duration the CJEU allows for the concomitant applica-
tion of the principle of pro rata temporis. The question to which we now 
turn is whether the Croatian rules on the accrual of the right to paid an-
nual leave are in line with this jurisprudence. We shall start by introduc-
ing the relevant national provisions on paid annual leave.
2.2 The Croatian law perspective
Whilst the right to paid annual leave is enshrined in the Croatian 
Constitution,32 Article 7 of the WTD is implemented by Heading VII of 
the LA (Rests and Leaves), which applies to all sectors of economic activ-
ity as a general act, entitling every worker to a minimum period of four 
weeks of leave per reference period of one calendar year.33 A longer dura-
tion of leave is granted to certain protected groups of workers,34 and the 
LA gives workers and employers the opportunity to bargain individually 
and collectively on this matter, provided that the statutory minimum is 
respected.35 During his/her annual leave, a worker has to be given com-
pensation which cannot be lower than the amount of the average sal-
ary that has been paid to him/her within the three months prior to the 
leave.36 An agreement on payment in lieu is null and void as well as any 
waiver of right to paid annual leave.37 In practice, four weeks of paid an-
32 Ustav republike Hrvatske (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia), Narodne Novine 
(Official Gazette), 56/1990, 135/1997, 8/1998, consolidated text, 113/2000, 124/2000; 
28/2001, 41/2001; 55/01; correction, 76/10 and 85/10.
33 LA (n 16) art 55(1). 
34 LA (n 16) art 55 (2) provides for a minimum of five weeks of paid annual leave to minor 
workers and workers who are subject to influences harmful for their health at work. 
35 LA (n 16) art 56 (1).
36 LA (n 16) art 60(1). 
37 LA (n 16) art 57. 
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nual leave are expressed in days, and so the exact number of days of 
paid annual leave depends on the organisation of the working week of a 
particular employer.38 Here, the rules on weekly rest play a role, as the 
days of weekly rest are exempted from the calculation of the number of 
days of annual holiday together with public holidays, statutory granted 
free days,39 and other types of leave (such as sick leave40 or maternity and 
parental leave),41 which are to be exercised in their own right. Therefore, 
for example, a worker who works five days a week and has two days of 
weekly rest is guaranteed twenty days of paid annual leave, whereas a 
worker who works six days a week (and has only one day of weekly rest, 
which is the statutory minimum) is guaranteed twenty-four days of an-
nual holiday. 
Special rules are provided for the accrual of the right to paid annual 
leave. Article 58(1) LA stipulates that a worker who is employed for the 
first time and a worker who has a gap between two consecutive employ-
ments longer than eight days acquire the right to annual leave after six 
months of a continuous employment relationship.42 However, a worker 
who does not meet these conditions is not left without leave during the 
first six months of work, since Article 58 LA should be read in conjunc-
tion with 59 LA which provides for a proportional period of paid annual 
leave. The latter article differentiates between four situations in which 
a worker meets the envisaged six-month period of continuous employ-
ment, three of those being of immediate interest to us. The first situa-
tion arises when a worker does not accrue six months of an employment 
relationship in the calendar year in which the employment started but 
who continues to be employed in the following calendar year.43 The sec-
ond one occurs when the employment relationship terminates before the 
six-month period in a given calendar year,44 and the third one deals with 
situations of termination of employment relationships before 1 July of a 
given calendar year.45 The aforementioned situations are complemented 
38 Opinion of the Ministry of Labour and Pension Systems, KLASA: 110-01/12-01/42, UR-
BROJ: 524-08-01-01/5-12-2, of 13 February 2011 <http://www.mrms.hr/topics/zakon-o-
radu/page/21/> accessed 28 June 2014.
39 LA (n 16) art 56(2).
40 LA (n 16) art 56(3). 
41 LA (n 16) art 63(3). 
42 According to Article 56(2) LA ‘[t]emporary inability to work, performing citizen duties in 
defence service or other situation of justifiable absence from work determined by law are 
not considered as interruption of work within the meaning of paragraph 1 of this Article.’
43 LA (n 16) art 59(1)(1).
44 LA (n 16) art 59(1)(2).
45 LA (n 16) art 59(1)(3). The fourth situation refers to workers who in a calendar year are 
employed by two or more employers on a part-time basis, and stipulates that the paid an-
nual leave with all these employers cannot exceed the statutory minimum of four weeks of 
paid annual leave. See LA, art 59(1)(4). 
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by the rules on the calculation of proportional time. The mathematical 
formula for the calculation of the proportional time of paid annual leave 
can be expressed in the following terms: 
X/12 x (WDPW x 4) = rounded days of paid annual leave
As a starting point, a worker has the right to one-twelfth of the pre-
scribed annual leave for each calendar month of work.46 Here, at least 
half of a month of work is rounded up to a whole month of work. There-
fore, ‘X’ signifies the number of months of work of a particular worker. 
The figure gained by division in the equation is then multiplied by work-
ing days per week (WDPW) with the particular employer, and again multi-
plied by 4 (the number of weeks of paid annual leave). However, the figure 
obtained by the last two mathematical operations does not necessarily 
give the exact number of days of paid annual leave. This is because, ac-
cording to the LA, at least half a day of annual leave is rounded up to a 
whole day of leave.47 To demonstrate how these rules operate, let us use 
a simple example: the agreed duration of employment was from 1 July to 
18 August on the basis of four working days per week. Even though the 
agreed period encompasses one month and 18 days, following the rules 
on calculation of accrual, it has to be considered that he/she was em-
ployed for two months. It also has to be considered that he/she accrued 
three days of paid annual leave, even though the rules of mathematics 
indicate that he/she in fact accrued 2.667 days of leave.48
The problem with the calculation of the proportionate amount of an-
nual leave lies in the aforementioned Article 59(2) LA. According to this, 
‘at least one half of a month of work is rounded up to a whole month 
[of work]’. On the positive side, it is clear that this provision grants the 
right to paid annual leave equal to one month of work to a worker who 
was engaged in employment for less than a month, provided that the 
employment relationship lasted at least half of a month. On the negative 
side, due to this provision, any work shorter than a half of a month in 
not taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating annual leave. 
This negative repercussion may arise in three situations. The first two are 
not so straightforward, as they cover situations in which the employment 
relationship lasts for more than half a month (but less than six months). 
In the first one, the employment relationship ends in the first half of a 
46 For a more in-depth explanation of the rules on the calculation of proportional time of 
paid annual leave, see V Ivanko, ‘Rok za stjecanje prava na godišnji odmor, pravo na razm-
jeni dio godišnjeg odmora, pravo na godišnji odmor kod promjene poslodavca’ [2013] Radno 
pravo 7-8, 32.
47 LA (n 16) art 59(2). 
48 Namely, 2/12 x (4 x 4) = 2.667.
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month. This would be the case if the employment relationship starts on 
1 July and ends on 11 August. In the second one, the employment re-
lationship starts in the second half of a month. This would occur if the 
employment relationship starts on 27 July and ends on 1 September. In 
these two situations, work performed over periods of time shorter than 
half a month is exempted from the calculation of the proportionate time 
of annual leave. In other words, during these periods, the worker does 
not accrue any annual leave, although he/she actually worked. The third 
situation is more straightforward, as it arises when the employment re-
lationship lasts, in total, for less than half a month, for example for 10 
days. Here, the worker is completely deprived of any paid annual leave 
and consequently any allowance in lieu.
In our opinion, the described negative repercussions of Article 59(2) 
LA make this provision of the LA highly contestable from the position 
of EU law. Namely, we find it in conflict with the CJEU’s ruling in the 
BECTU case, for it is, albeit construed as a condition of exercising the 
right to paid annual leave, in essence a precondition for entitlement to 
paid annual leave. This is most evident in situations when the beginning 
of an employment relationship falls in the second half of a month, and 
when the total duration of an employment relationship does not meet the 
condition of half a month of work. Although the CJEU has never ruled 
on a situation when the accrual of paid annual leave is suspended before 
the end of the employment relationship,49 we find the principle expressed 
in BECTU of equal relevance simply because the worker is not entitled to 
leave for the period of time in which she or he actually worked, without 
having any reduction in their working time. The discrepancy between Ar-
ticle 59(2) and EU law becomes even more striking when we refer to the 
Dominguez case in which the CJEU stated that the entitlement to paid 
annual leave cannot be conditioned even by periods of minimum actu-
al work. Furthermore, from the perspective of the BECTU and Dominguez 
cases, we see no difference between whether the entitlement to paid an-
nual leave is suspended from accrual at the beginning or at the end of 
the employment relationship, or for the whole duration of it. What we 
find important here is that those workers who are in a weaker bargaining 
position with regard to the calendar date on which the employment rela-
tionship starts or ends are deprived of accruing the right to paid annual 
leave without any objective justification. To that end, it is necessary to 
emphasise that the three described situations which might result from 
the application of Article 59(2) to the workers’ detriment need to be dif-
ferentiated from the Heimann and Toltchin case for two reasons. First, in 
the aforementioned case, the workers’ duty to work was completely or 
49 In Heimann and Toltschin (n 30), the non-accrual of the right to paid annual leave started 
after the end of the employment relationship. 
169CYELP 10 [2014] 159-187
partially suspended. In Croatian law, as already mentioned, it is quite 
the opposite. Second, in Heimann and Toltchin, there was a direct link 
between the suspension from work and the benefit for the workers, as the 
German Federal Employment Agency envisaged a special unemployment 
benefit (Kurzabeitgeld) for those working on ‘zero hours-short time work-
ing’. In Croatian law, as it now stands, periods of time shorter than half 
a month are not per se taken into account for the purposes of unemploy-
ment benefit. Even though they are taken into consideration for the pur-
pose of qualification for unemployment benefit,50 whether or not they will 
actually lead to unemployment benefit is a matter of the personal work 
history of an individual worker and not an issue of a co-ordinated state 
policy. Therefore, as in the Tirols case, it is difficult to see any objective 
justification for the provision of Article 59(2) LA. 
3. The relationship between paid annual leave and other periods of 
leave
3.1 The EU law perspective
Probably the most litigated aspect of the right to paid annual leave is 
that concerning the relationship between this kind of leave and other pe-
riods of leave. This arises in situations when annual leave, usually fixed 
in advance by a statute, collective agreement or employer’s unilateral 
decision, coincides with a period of another leave, and has three strands. 
The first one poses the question whether the right to paid annual leave 
accrues during other periods of leave. In the last section, we saw that the 
CJEU answered this question in the affirmative with regard to sick leave, 
stating that the right to paid annual leave conferred by the WTD cannot 
be made subject to a condition to have actually worked during the refer-
ence period laid down by a Member State.51 The second strand raises the 
issue whether other periods of leave consume acquired but untaken paid 
annual leave, while the third one, which will be discussed more closely in 
the following section, concerns the question of the existence and length of 
the carry-over period of untaken paid annual leave. While the text of the 
WTD is silent on these three issues, the CJEU has been quite resolute in 
defending the right to take annual leave. 
The protection of workers who are unable to take paid annual leave 
in the reference period started with the securing of this right when an-
nual leave coincides with other leave recognised by EU law. The issue 
50 According to the Act on Employment Intermediation and Rights in the Case of Unem-
ployment, a person qualifying for unemployment benefit has to be employed for at least nine 
inconsecutive months in a period of twenty-four consecutive months, Act on Employment 
Intermediation and Rights in the Case of Unemployment 2008, art 37(1).
51 Schultz-Hoff and Stringer (n 23) paras 40-41; Dominguez (n 6) para 20. 
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of overlap was raised for the first time in the Merino Gómez52 case with 
regard to maternity leave granted by the Pregnant Workers Directive.53 
Ms Merino Gómez was a factory worker whose maternity leave coincided 
with the period of acquired annual leave pre-fixed by a collective agree-
ment. Consequently, she was denied the right to take paid annual leave 
at a later date. For the CJEU, it was crucial to examine the purpose of the 
entitlement to annual leave. The Court concluded that it: 
is different from that of the entitlement to maternity leave. Ma-
ternity leave is intended, first, to protect a woman’s biological 
condition during and after pregnancy and, second, to protect 
the special relationship between a woman and her child over the 
period which follows pregnancy and childbirth.54
In the light of this, the CJEU distinguished between annual leave 
and maternity leave, and concluded that in such circumstances ‘a worker 
must be able to take her annual leave during a period other than the pe-
riod of her maternity leave’.55 This conclusion was bolstered by the Sex 
Equality Directive,56 which required equal treatment of men and women 
with regard to working conditions. Therefore, women could not be sub-
jected to unfavourable treatment regarding the right to take annual leave 
because of pregnancy or maternity. 
While the recognition of the right to take annual leave separately 
from maternity leave did not raise much controversy,57 probably be-
cause it tackled the issue of sex equality, the jurisprudence which fol-
lowed demonstrated that the CJEU is ready to give full effect to the right 
to annual leave even when it coincides with a period of leave which is 
not recognised by EU law. The joint Schultz-Hoff and Stringer cases were 
52 Merino Gómez (n 6).
53 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and work-
ers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the 
meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) [1992] OJ L348/1.
54 Merino Gómez (n 6) para 32.
55 Merino Gómez (n 6) para 37.
56 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the prin-
ciple of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L39/40. Now replaced by Direc-
tive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the im-
plementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women 
in matters of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23. 
57 Merino Gómez (n 6) was a Chamber case. Only two Member States submitted written ob-
servations (Spain and Italy), both in favour of Ms Merino Gómez (see Case C-342/01 Merino 
Gómez [2004] ECR I-02605, Opinion of AG Mischo, paras 27-28). 
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ground-breaking in this respect.58 In Schultz-Hoff, the applicant was on 
long-term sick leave due to which he was unable to take annual leave. 
Upon retirement related to his incapacity to work, he demanded payment 
in lieu for the 2 years in which he was on sick leave. Stringer concerned 
two categories of applicants. The first, similar to Mr Schultz-Hoff, were 
on long-term sick leave before the termination of their contracts, and de-
manded payment in lieu, while the second involved a worker who was on 
sick leave of indefinite duration and who wished to take a number of days 
of paid annual leave for a certain period following her request. In both 
the Schultz-Hoff and Stringer cases, the applicants were refused on the 
grounds of national laws which required that the annual leave be taken 
in the year to which it referred or in the carry-over period following that 
year. As in the Merino Gómez case, the CJEU distinguished the purposes 
of the two kinds of leave in question, and found that while:
it is common ground that the purpose of the entitlement to paid 
annual leave is to enable the worker to rest and to enjoy a period 
of relaxation and leisure[, t]he purpose of the entitlement to sick 
leave is different. It is given to the worker so that he can recover 
from being ill.59 
The CJEU, however, also contrasted maternity and sick leave, since 
the latter right is not governed by EU law.60 Nonetheless, the CJEU re-
called the aforementioned BECTU judgment, reiterating that, although it 
is for the Member States to lay down the conditions for the exercise and 
implementation of the right to paid annual leave, they are not allowed to 
make the very existence of that right subject to any preconditions what-
soever. Consequently, the CJEU concluded that Article 7(1) WTD does 
not preclude national legislation or practice from either allowing61 or pre-
58 Schultz-Hoff and Stringer (n 23) was a Grand Chamber case. Written observations were 
submitted by eight Member States (Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Czech Re-
public, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia).
59 Schultz-Hoff and Stringer (n 23) para 25.
60 Schultz-Hoff and Stringer (n 23) para 27. Although Bogg is of the view that maternity 
leave should in this context be treated differently from sick leave, he also notes that ‘it is 
a fair criticism of the Court of Justice in Stringer that it never explains why this difference 
should be legally consequential’. He explains that demarcation of Community-guaranteed 
periods of leave, regardless of worker or employer preferences, ensures ‘the integrity of 
important collective goods such as a public culture respective of gender equality and equal 
parenting’. What makes the interrelationship between annual leave and sick leave (as a pe-
riod of leave granted only by national law) different is that permitting workers to ‘designate a 
period of sick leave as annual leave is facilitative of worker autonomy without undermining 
the public culture of respect for gender equality and equal parenting’. A Bogg, ‘Of Holidays, 
Work and Humanisation: A Missed Opportunity?’ [2009] 34 EL Rev 738, 742, 745. 
61 Schultz-Hoff and Stringer (n 23) para 31. 
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cluding62 a worker on sick leave from taking paid annual leave during 
that leave, providing that the worker has the opportunity to exercise the 
right to paid annual leave during another period.63 Regarding the ques-
tion of the extinction of the right to annual leave due to the termination 
of the employment contract, the CJEU finally stated that neither the right 
to paid annual leave nor the right to payment in lieu is lost due to the 
termination of the employment relationship when the worker’s incapac-
ity to work, which was the reason why he could not exercise his right to 
annual leave in the first place, continues after that date. 
Subsequent CJEU judgments dealt with other aspects of the right to 
paid annual leave, such as the issue of a worker becoming unfit for work 
before the date of his allocated annual leave64 and becoming unfit for 
work during a period of paid annual leave.65 In both situations, the CJEU 
concluded that a worker has to subsequently be entitled to the untaken 
annual leave. Regarding the scheduling of the new period of leave, the 
CJEU observed that it is subject to the rules and procedures of national 
law applicable to the scheduling of workers’ leave, and should take into 
account the various interests involved, including overriding reasons re-
lating to the interests of the undertaking. If such interests preclude ac-
ceptance of the worker’s request:
the employer is obliged to grant the worker a different period of 
annual leave proposed by him which is compatible with those 
interests, without excluding in advance the possibility that that 
period may fall outside the reference period for the annual leave 
in question.66
Summing up the CJEU case law on overlaps, it cannot be inferred 
that either maternity or sick leave can be used as an obstacle to the exer-
cise of the right to paid annual leave. This does not mean that one leave 
should prevail over the other. It simply means that the Member States 
62 Schultz-Hoff and Stringer (n 23) para 29.
63 Bogg thinks that there are three possible answers to the question of exercising the enti-
tlement to annual leave during a period of sick leave: I) the ‘prohibitive’ model (AG Trsten-
jak’s approach), requiring Member States to exercise annual leave during sick leave; II) the 
‘permissive’ model (the CJEU’s approach), allowing Member States to choose either to per-
mit or to prohibit the exercise of annual leave during sick leave; III) the ‘facilitative’ model, 
the ‘humanisation of work’ approach (upheld by the author), requiring Member States to 
permit annual leave to be exercised during sick leave. He believes workers’ autonomy is only 
protected sufficiently by the ‘facilitative’ model: it should be the workers’ choice to designate 
(or not to designate) a period of sick leave as annual leave. Bogg (n 60) 740-745.
64 Case C-277/08 Pereda [2009] ECR I-08405; Case C-194/12 Maestre García [2013] ECR 
I-000.
65 Case C-78/11 ANGED [2012] ECR I-000.
66 See also Pereda (n 64) para 23; Maestre García (n 64) para 23. 
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should take all necessary measures to accommodate paid annual leave 
with maternity and sick leave. 
So far, we have focused on the way the CJEU has addressed the is-
sue of overlap between paid annual leave and other periods of leave. We 
will now turn to provisions of Croatian law regulating this matter. We 
start by considering the rules on overlap between paid annual leave and 
sick, maternity, parental and adoption leave, respectively. Following this, 
we question the regulation of the overlap between paid annual leave and 
other types of paid and unpaid leave recognised by Croatian law. 
3.2 The Croatian law perspective
3.2.1 Maternity, parental and adoption leave
The LA contains only very broad stipulations regarding periods 
which should not interfere with the duration of paid annual leave, provid-
ing in Article 56 that ‘bank holidays and non-working days established 
by law are not included in the duration of annual leave’67 as well as ‘a 
period of temporary inability to work, which was confirmed by an author-
ized physician’.68 While it is clear that the latter formulation refers to sick 
leave, it is not quite clear whether the formulation ‘non-working days 
established by law’ encompasses maternity leave, parental and adoption 
leave.69 Both jurisprudence and doctrine are silent on this issue. Be that 
as it may, it seems that this vagueness of the statutory provision does not 
pose a serious problem in practice. This is probably because these three 
types of leave are explicitly mentioned in Article 63(3) LA, which provides 
for more favourable regulation of carrying over untaken or interrupted 
annual leave to the following calendar year for workers who have been 
unable to take it due to ‘illness or maternity, parental or adoption leave.’ 
We are of the opinion that this provision makes it clear that maternity, 
parental or adoption leave interrupt annual leave, and that a worker shall 
be granted the right to paid annual leave after the maternity, parental 
or adoption leave has expired.70 Besides this, in practice Article 63(3) LA 
has been interpreted in a way that the right to paid annual leave does not 
stop accruing during sick, maternity, parental or adoption leave.71
67 LA, art 56(2).
68 LA, art 56(3). 
69 Entitlement to and duration of maternity, parental and adoption leave is regulated by 
the Maternity and Parental Benefits Act 2008.
70 We would like to thank Ivana Grgurev for drawing our attention to this provision. 
71 Opinion of the Ministry of Labour and Pension Systems, KLASA: 110-01/12-01/161, 
URBROJ: 524-08-01-01/5-12-2, of 12 April 2012 and KLASA: 110-01/12-01/161, UR-
BROJ: 524-08-01-01/5-12-4, of 5 June 2012 <http://www.mrms.hr/topics/zakon-o-
radu/page/20/> accessed 28 June 2014.
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Therefore, we find this provision to be in compliance with Article 7 
WTD. Nonetheless, at this point we would like to address a concern that 
has been raised in relation to the potential ramifications of the Schultz-
Hoff and Stringer judgment, which established the rule that the right 
of workers on sick leave to take annual leave cannot be extinguished 
at the end of the carry-over period. Although acknowledging that this 
rule favours workers, some commentators have raised doubts that this 
rule could lead to the termination of the employment of sick workers by 
employers in order to avoid the financial and practical ramifications of 
long periods of accrued annual leave.72 We believe that under Croatian 
law, there is no place for such a concern for a number of reasons. First, 
the LA expressly prohibits the dismissal of workers on sick leave when a 
temporary inability to work is caused by an injury at work or an occupa-
tional disease.73 Such workers can only be dismissed upon their return 
to work, following a procedure which offers a number of safeguards in 
favour of the worker.74 Second, even though the LA does not prohibit 
the dismissal of workers on sick leave which is not related to injury at 
work or an occupational disease, it expressly states that that leave on the 
grounds of disease or injury cannot be a reason for dismissal.75 Third, in 
the case of dismissal, the burden of proof is on the employer, who has to 
prove that the dismissal was legally justified.76 Fourth, the LA stipulates 
that in the case of dismissal, the notice period does not run during sick 
leave, irrespective of the reasons which led to the temporary inability 
to work.77 Needless to say, the right to paid annual leave does not stop 
accruing during the dismissal period even though the worker is on sick 
leave.78 Finally, the provisions of the LA are additionally bolstered by the 
provisions of the Anti-discrimination Act, which prohibits discrimination 
on the grounds of both disability and health status in relation to working 
conditions, which includes dismissal.79 
72 See R Capper, ‘The Right to Have Holiday Pay whilst off Sick’ [2009] 30(6) Business Law 
Review 134; C Barnard, EU Employment Law (4th edn, OUP 2012), 546.
73 LA, art 74(1).
74 LA, arts 78-79, 107. Safeguards include, for example, the duty to prequalify the worker 
for work which suits his/her health condition or to offer better suited work. In addition, 
in general, it is not possible to dismiss this type of worker without the approval of a works 
council or trade union representative.
75 LA, art 109(1). 
76 LA, art 131.
77 LA, art 113(2). 
78 Opinion of the Ministry of Labour and Pension Systems of 25 January 2010 <http://
www.mrms.hr/topics/zakon-o-radu/page/21/> accessed 28 June 2014. 
79 Zakon o suzbijanju diskriminacije (Anti-discrimination Act), Narodne novine (Official Ga-
zette), 85/08, 112/12) arts 1(1), 8(1)(1).
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3.2.3 Other leave recognised by Croatian law and its conflict with the right 
to paid annual leave
So far, the CJEU has dealt only with the conflict between the right 
to paid annual leave and maternity leave (as a period of leave granted by 
EU law) and sick leave (as a period of leave not granted by EU law). The 
Croatian legal system knows many other types of paid and unpaid leave 
which fall outside the category of leave regulated by EU law. 
The LA provides for several different types of paid leave. It envisages 
leave days for important personal affairs. What qualifies as an important 
personal affair is illustrated by the LA with the examples of marriage, 
childbirth of a spouse, and the serious illness or death of a member of the 
immediate family. 80 In addition, it grants leave for the purpose of work-
related education,81 and also envisages one free day for blood donors.82 
The purpose of the aforementioned different types of paid leave is 
functionally distinct from that of paid annual leave. Their aim is to give 
the opportunity to deal with issues different from rest and leisure, such 
as dealing with certain important personal affairs, receiving education or 
for recovery from blood loss after donating blood. In our opinion, if cir-
cumstances granting the right to these different types of paid leave occur 
while a worker is taking or is supposed to be taking paid annual leave, the 
right to paid annual leave should not be affected. In the case of an over-
lap, the employer should be obliged to grant the worker a different period 
of annual leave or the untaken portion of annual leave. This conclusion 
can be bolstered by the provisions of Article 65(5) LA, which states that, 
for the purpose of accrual of the right to paid annual leave, the aforemen-
tioned types of paid annual leave are considered as time spent at work. In 
other words, they do not prevent paid annual leave from accruing. Given 
this, we see no reason why in the case of overlap they should consume 
days of paid annual leave. The Croatian Ministry of Labour83 has taken 
a similar view. If circumstances under which paid leave is to be granted 
occur during annual leave, the annual leave is interrupted. Spending an-
nual leave on dealing with important personal matters (like the death of 
a family member) would be contrary to the purpose of annual leave. In 
such circumstances, the untaken annual leave should be exercised at a 
later date, after the period of unfitness to work has ended, in accordance 
80 LA, art 65(1). The total duration of this leave is seven working days a year, unless other-
wise stipulated by a collective agreement, employment by-laws or employment contract (LA, 
art 65(2)). 
81 LA, art 65(4). The duration of this leave is determined by a collective agreement, an 
agreement between the works council and the employer or employment by-laws.
82 LA, art 65(6). 
83 Opinion of the Ministry of Labour and Pension Systems, Klasa: 110-01/99-01/176, of 
15 April 1999.
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with the arrangement made between the worker and his employer, and in 
compatibility with the interests of the undertaking. 
The latter conclusion can be reached in relation to the overlap of 
already accrued paid annual leave and types of leave which are unpaid. 
Under Article 66 LA, the employer may grant a worker unpaid leave for 
unspecified reasons at his/her request. During such unpaid leave, the 
rights and obligations arising from employment or related to employ-
ment are suspended, unless otherwise specified by the law. Provisions 
on unpaid leave can be found in the Maternity and Parental Benefits Act 
(MPBA).84 Article 22 MPBA states that an employment relationship can be 
suspended after the exhaustion of maternity and parental leave until the 
child of the worker reaches the age of three. If the child of a worker has 
a severe disability, he/she can take unpaid leave until the child reaches 
the age of eight (Article 23 MPBA). Even though there is no jurisprudence 
on this matter, we think that the taking of these two types of leave can-
not consume already accrued paid annual leave for two reasons. First, 
they would fall under the definition of ‘non-working days established by 
law’, which according to Article 56 LA are ‘not calculated in the duration 
of annual leave’, and second, they are unpaid. Given the fact that in both 
Croatian and EU law the entitlement to paid annual leave is formed of 
two constitutive elements, leave as the first one, and pay as the second, 
we think that it would be completely unacceptable from the point of view 
of both legal systems if unpaid leave could consume accrued paid an-
nual leave. Therefore, in the case of overlap between accrued paid annual 
leave and unpaid leave from Article 66 LA and Articles 22 and 23 MPBA, 
any untaken paid annual leave should be scheduled in accordance with 
arrangements made between the worker and his employer, and in com-
patibility with the interests of the undertaking, at some later date. This 
does not mean, however, that a worker who is on unpaid leave for several 
years will be able to effectively use all the annual leave that has built up 
before a long period of unpaid leave. As we shall see in the next section, 
due to the provisions of the LA which regulate the carry-over period, the 
possibility for the exercise of non-taken annual leave can be quite limited. 
However, before we end this section it is necessary to discuss one 
important difference between other paid leave and other unpaid leave re-
garding the accrual of paid annual leave. In the case of other paid leave, 
the LA is quite clear in that the right to paid annual leave continues to 
accrue while a worker is on such leave. On one hand, in the cases of Ar-
ticle 66 LA and Article 22 MPBA unpaid leave, both the LA and the MPBA 
state that during such leave, employment rights and obligations are sus-
84 Zakon o rodiljnim i roditeljskim potporama (Maternity and Parental Benefits Act), Narodne 
novine (Official Gazette) 85/08, 110/08, 34/11, 54/13.
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pended. On the other hand, Article 23 MPBA is silent on the issue of the 
suspension of unemployment rights for working parents of children with 
severe disability. Despite this difference, in our opinion it seems that in 
all three of the aforementioned cases of unpaid leave the right to paid 
annual leave is prevented from accruing.85 If our presumption is true, 
it will be necessary for the CJEU to clarify whether this non-accrual of 
the right to paid annual leave is allowed from the perspective of EU law. 
In our opinion, in the case of Article 66 LA unpaid leave for unspecified 
reasons, there is no room for conflict due to the fact that the leave can be 
used for any reason, including rest and leisure. There is no obligation for 
the worker to give reasons for this leave. Moreover, the recognition of the 
accrual of the right to paid annual leave during this type of leave could 
serve as an incentive for employers to defer workers’ requests for unpaid 
leave, as there is no obligation for the employer to grant Article 66 LA 
unpaid leave. This would undoubtedly render Article 66 LA unpaid leave 
meaningless. Furthermore, in our opinion, Article 66 LA unpaid leave can 
be comparable to the workers working ‘zero-hours short time working’ in 
the Heimann and Toltschin case mentioned in the previous section, where 
the CJEU said the non-accrual of paid annual leave during this work 
arrangement did not violate Article 7 WTD and the right to paid annual 
leave. The situation is a bit more controversial when it comes to the afore-
mentioned unpaid leave envisaged by the MPBA. Unlike the situation in 
the Heimann and Toltschin case, workers taking this unpaid leave are 
not ‘free to devote [themselves] to recreational and leisure activities’,86 as 
they are taking care of their children. Therefore, the purpose of Articles 
22 and 23 MPBA is different from that of paid annual leave. However, 
there are some important differences between Articles 22 and 23 MPBA 
on unpaid leave. In the case of Article 22 MPBA unpaid leave, workers do 
not enjoy health insurance and pension insurance rights,87 they have no 
right to salary and they receive no remuneration from the state. They can 
take Article 22 MPBA leave only once they have exhausted maternity and 
parental leave. In the case of Article 23 MPBA, workers still enjoy health 
insurance and pension rights as ‘workers’. Even though they do not have 
the right to a salary from their employer, they receive remuneration from 
85 According to Barjaktar, the right to paid annual leave accrues only during sick leave, 
maternity, parental and adoption leave. B Barjaktar, ‘Uvjeti za prenošenje godišnjeg odmora 
u iduću kalendarsku godinu’, published 5 June 2014 <http://www.iusinfo.hr> accessed 28 
June 2014. See Opinion of the Ministry of Labour and Pension Systems, Klasa: 110-01/11-
01/276, of 2 August 2011. 
86 Heimann and Toltschin (n 30) para 29.
87 They can enjoy health insurance only as a member of the family of an insured person 
(Obligatory Health Insurance Act, art 10). They can enjoy pension insurance rights only if 
they pay the contributions for this insurance themselves (Pension Insurance Act 2013, art 
18(2)(2)).
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the state.88 In addition, they can exchange Article 23 MPBA unpaid leave 
for part-time work, which triggers the accrual of their right to paid an-
nual leave.89 Finally, they can take Article 23 MPBA leave whilst being on 
parental leave, in which case their parental leave is suspended.90
The employment status of workers on Article 22 MPBA leave is com-
parable to the status of workers on Article 66 LA unpaid leave for unspec-
ified reasons, but with the difference that an Article 22 MPBA request for 
leave cannot be refused by their employer. When we take into account 
that the purpose of this leave is different from that of paid annual leave, 
we are unsure if the aforementioned characteristics are strong enough to 
claim that the non-accrual of the right to paid annual leave during Article 
22 MPBA unpaid leave is in violation of Article 7 WTD.91 However, due 
to the aforementioned characteristics of Article 23 MPBA unpaid leave, 
we think that the non-accrual of the right to paid annual leave would 
be in violation of Article 7 WTD. Moreover, we perceive Article 23 MPBA 
unpaid leave as a hybrid between parental leave and sick leave by virtue 
of its association with a child with a disability. In our opinion, the latter 
characteristic triggers the application of Directive 78/2000/EC,92 which 
specifically prohibits discrimination by association with regard to disabil-
ity in employment and working conditions.
4. Carrying unexercised annual leave over into the next calendar 
year
4.1 The EU law perspective
The carry-over period is a mechanism which enables the exercise of 
paid annual leave in a period following the reference period for which it 
was aggregated. Its benefits lie in the fact that it allows the interests of 
workers and employers to be taken into account. On one hand, it serves 
as a safety valve in cases where a worker is precluded from taking an-
nual leave in the reference period.93 It also takes account of the fact that 
88 MPBA, art 23(7).
89 MPBA, art 23(2).
90 MPBA, art 23(1), and (3).
91 The answer would be probably a bit clearer if the CJEU ever answers the question of 
whether the right to paid annual leave accrues during parental leave. Since Article 22 MPBA 
unpaid leave comes on top of parental leave, a negative answer would probably imply that 
the non-accrual of paid annual leave during this leave does not violate Article 7 WTD. A 
positive answer, however, would still leave us in doubt.
92 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework 
for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16, arts 1, 3. Discrimi-
nation by association with disability within employment is prohibited in EU law. See Case 
C-303/06 Coleman [2008] ECR I-05603.
93 Karl Riesenhuber, ‘Joined Cases C-350/06 and c-520/06, Gerhard Schultz-Hoff v 
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the worker’s need for rest does not increase linearly with the proportion 
of time spent working. On the other hand, it enables the employer to or-
ganise work effectively without losing time and money because his/her 
workers are on annual leave,94 protecting him/her from the risk that a 
worker will accumulate periods of absence of too great a length.95 From 
the perspective of the WTD, the issue of the carry-over period is closely 
related to the conditions for granting paid annual leave, which is in prin-
ciple a matter for the Member States to decide.96 However, as we have 
seen in the previous section, when it comes to the conflict between paid 
annual leave and sick leave or maternity leave, the CJEU refuses to ac-
cept that the right to paid annual leave has lapsed and demands that the 
Member States enable it to be taken at a later date. In this way, the CJEU 
touched upon the issue of the carry-over period of untaken annual leave. 
Two types of questions emerged here. The first one concerned the pos-
sibility of the aggregation of several periods of annual leave, tackling in 
essence the issue of whether the WTD demands Member States recognise 
the carry-over period. The second addressed the length of that period.
The first case raising the issue of the aggregation of several peri-
ods of annual leave was Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging.97 The case 
concerned an information brochure published by the Dutch Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment stating that a worker can obtain cash in 
exchange for leave days above the mandatory minimum number of days 
per year or days which have been saved up over the course of previous 
years. Although the CJEU noted that ‘the positive effect which that leave 
has for the safety and health of the worker is deployed fully if it is taken 
in the year prescribed for that purpose, namely the current year’,98 it 
nonetheless recognised the inevitability of carrying annual leave over in 
some situations, stating that ‘the significance of that rest period in that 
regard remains if it is taken during a later period’.99 This was due to the 
fact that, in the CJEU’s view, leave may still, when taken during a later 
year, contribute to the safety and health of the worker.100 Therefore, ‘the 
possibility of financial compensation in respect of the minimum period of 
annual leave carried over would create an incentive, incompatible with 
the objectives of the directive, not to take leave or to encourage employees 
Deutsche rentenversicherung Bund and Mrs C. Stringer and Others v Her Majesty’s rev-
enue and Customs, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 20 January 2009, not yet 
reported [2009]’ 46 CML Rev 2107, 2111. See also Schultz-Hoff and Stringer (n 23) para 42. 
94 Reisenhuber (n 93). 
95 Case C-214/10 KHS [2011] ECR I-11757, para 39.
96 Schultz-Hoff and Stringer (n 23) para 42.
97 Case C-124/05 Federatie Nederlandse Vakebeweiging [2006] ECR I-03423.
98 Federatie Nederlandse Vakebeweiging (n 97) para 30.
99 Federatie Nederlandse Vakebeweiging (n 97).
100 Federatie Nederlandse Vakebeweiging (n 97) para 31.
180 Željko Potočnjak, Andrea Grgić, Iva Čatipović: The right to paid annual leave...
not to do so.’101 By this, the CJEU recognised that the WTD right to paid 
annual leave implies in certain situations the right to carry over annual 
leave accumulated with time. 
The cases which followed were more concerned with the duration of 
the carry-over period. The issue emerged for the first time as one of the 
potential and most criticised ramifications of the aforementioned Schultz-
Hoff and Stringer case. To recap, one of the issues raised in this case, 
with regard to Mr Schultz-Hoff, was whether the entitlement to paid an-
nual leave is extinguished at the end of the reference period of one cal-
endar year and the carry-over period of 6 months102 if a worker’s sick 
leave has extended beyond the reference period and carry-over period. 
The Court gave its answer by stating that Article 7(1) WTD does not pre-
clude, as a rule, national legislation which provides for the loss of the 
right to paid annual leave at the end of a reference or carry-over period. It 
added that the worker must have actually had the opportunity to exercise 
the right to paid annual leave for this rule to be applicable.103 Thus, the 
overall answer to the question posed by the national court was negative. 
Even though in the case of Mr Schultz-Hoff the carry-over period of the 
first 6 months of the following calendar year in hindsight seems short, 
the CJEU did not, however provide any guidance as to the duration of 
the carry-over period which would have been appropriate for providing 
the opportunity for annual leave in the case of its overlap with sick leave 
of a longer duration. Because of this omission, after the judgment in the 
Schultz-Hoff and Stringer case, the right to carry over untaken paid an-
nual leave seemed almost unlimited. 
Certain limits to the length of the carry-over period were set in the 
KHS104 case. Mr Schulte suffered from a heart attack in January 2002, 
which left him seriously disabled until the end of his employment rela-
tionship in 2008. Since his incapacity to work prevented him from taking 
the right to paid annual leave, in 2009 he brought an action for payment 
of allowances in lieu of the untaken paid annual leave for the calendar 
years 2006, 2007 and 2008. The CJEU held that although the previous 
case law indicates that a national rule laying down a carry-over period 
cannot stipulate that a worker’s right to paid annual leave will lapse 
without him actually having had the opportunity to exercise that right, 
‘that conclusion must none the less be qualified in specific circumstances 
such as those in the main proceedings’.105 Otherwise, a worker unfit for 
101 Federatie Nederlandse Vakebeweiging (n 97) para 32.
102 The provisions of national law which were relevant to the Schultz-Hoff case can be found 
in Schultz-Hoff and Stringer (n 23) Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para 6.
103 Schultz-Hoff and Stringer (n 23) para 43.
104 KHS (n 95). 
105 KHS (n 95) para 28.
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work for several consecutive years would be entitled to accumulate an-
nual leave without any limit. The right to such unlimited accumulation 
of entitlements to paid annual leave, acquired during such a period of 
unfitness for work, ‘would no longer reflect the actual purpose of the 
right to paid annual leave’.106 The Court then provided guidance as to the 
duration of the carry-over period which would be appropriate to uphold 
the right to paid annual leave. It stated that the carry-over period must 
take into account the specific circumstances of a worker who is unfit for 
work for several consecutive reference periods. Besides this, any carry-
over period must ensure that the worker can have, if needed, rest periods 
that may be staggered, planned in advance and available in the longer 
term, and that it must also be substantially longer than the reference 
period in respect of which it is granted.107 Since the carry-over period of 
15 months envisaged by national law was longer than the reference pe-
riod of one calendar year to which it related, the CJEU concluded that 
the purpose of Article 7(1) WTD was safeguarded.108 Following this line of 
reasoning, in the Neidel case109 the CJEU ruled that the carry-over period 
of 9 months, as it was shorter than the reference period of one year to 
which it related, did not meet the requirements of the WTD.110
4.2 The Croatian law perspective
In section 2, it was mentioned that the LA provides for four weeks of 
paid annual leave per reference period of one calendar year.111 In this sec-
tion, we will introduce the rules on the organisation of paid annual leave 
which are relevant to the discussion on the carry-over period. They will 
then be analysed against the backdrop of CJEU case law.
In principle, the planning of annual leave is in the hands of the em-
ployer, who has to publish a schedule of the paid annual leave for the 
current year by 30 June of the same year.112 Rules on the establishment 
of this schedule balance the interests of workers and the employer in 
the following way. Every worker is allowed to use one day of paid an-
nual leave when it pleases him/her.113 The employer must respect the re-
quested dates for annual leave of part-time workers who are employed by 
different employers, unless all employers of that part-time worker reach 
106 KHS (n 95) para 30. 
107 KHS (n 95) para 38.
108 KHS (n 95) para 43.
109 Case C-337/10 Neidel [2012] ECR I-000.
110 Neidel (n 109) paras 41-42.
111 LA, art 55(1).
112 LA, art 64(1).
113 LA, art 64(5).
182 Željko Potočnjak, Andrea Grgić, Iva Čatipović: The right to paid annual leave...
agreement on the dates of the worker’s annual leave.114 In all other situa-
tions, an employer is only obliged to take into account the interests of the 
workers and balance them with the needs of the work process.115 
Unless agreed differently, the LA stipulates that a worker can take 
his/her leave in two parts. Two consecutive weeks of paid annual leave 
have to be taken in the reference period,116 and the untaken remainder 
of the annual leave has to be used by 30 June of the following calendar 
year.117 However, if the worker is given the opportunity to use the whole of 
their paid annual leave within the reference period, he/she has no right 
to carry it over.118 A special exemption to the rule that full annual leave 
cannot be carried over into the following calendar year has been given to 
two groups of workers. The first one consists of workers who have not 
been able to take their paid annual leave within the reference period due 
to illness, or maternity, parental or adoption leave. This category of work-
ers can use any untaken paid annual leave by 30 June of the following 
calendar year.119 Even more preferential treatment has been given to a 
second category of workers. Members of a ship’s crew, posted workers 
and workers who have performed civil defence duty are entitled to carry 
over untaken annual leave until the end of the following calendar year.120 
It is also important to state that in all cases carried-over paid annual 
leave has to be used by the end of the envisaged period.121 
The aforementioned rules demonstrate the following. First, the LA 
recognises a vast category of ‘ordinary workers’ that encompasses all 
workers who do not fall within one of the two aforementioned privileged 
categories. They can use the carry-over period only if their employer did 
not give them an opportunity to use their full paid annual leave within 
the reference period. Second, the first 6 months of the following calendar 
year is a general rule on the duration of the carry-over period, which is 
as applicable to workers who have been on sick, maternity, parental or 
adoption leave as it is to ‘ordinary workers’. However, in comparison with 
‘ordinary workers’, the former category of workers is in a better position, 
because they can use the whole of their paid annual leave in the first 
six months of the following year. Third, the most privileged category of 
114 LA, art 64(2).
115 LA, art 64(3).
116 LA, art 62(2).
117 LA, art 63(1).
118 LA, art 63(2).
119 LA, art 63(3).
120 LA, art 63(4). 
121 Opinion of the Ministry of Labour and Pension Systems, KLASA: 110-01/10-01/24, 
URBROJ: 526-08-01-01/1-10-2, of 23 February 2010 and KLASA: 110-01/12-01/161, 
URBROJ: 524-08-01-01/5-12-2, of 12 April 2012 <http://www.mrms.hr/topics/zakon-o-
radu/page/20/> accessed 28 June 2014.
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workers are the members of a ship’s crew, posted workers and workers 
who have performed civil defence duty, as they benefit from a carry-over 
period of one year.
With the benefit of the hindsight of CJEU case law, we find that all of 
the aforementioned rules on the carry-over period raise doubts as to their 
compatibility with EU law. The discrepancy between national and EU law 
is most striking when it comes to workers on sick, maternity, parental 
and adoption leave. 
As far as sick leave is concerned, in Schultz-Hoff and Stringer and 
Neidel, the CJEU ruled that the carry-over periods of 6 months and 9 
months respectively were not long enough to accommodate the right to 
paid annual leave with sick leave, because they were shorter than the 
reference period of one calendar year that they referred to. Given the fact 
that in Croatian law this type of leave can last for more than a year,122 it 
is clear that the carry-over period of 6 months is not long enough to ac-
commodate long-term sick leave. 
Turning to maternity, parental and adoption leave, it is important to 
state that the CJEU has so far not examined the actual duration of the 
national regulation concerning the carry-over period in cases of overlap 
with paid annual leave. However, we find that the Schultz-Hoff/Neidel line 
of jurisprudence could be of equal importance here. Namely, the purpose 
of paid annual leave is seriously hampered by the duration of the carry-
over period applicable to this category of workers, given that in Croatian 
law maternity leave and adoption leave can last up to 6 months,123 and 
parental leave can last between 6 and 30 months.124 The discrepancy is, 
of course, even more striking when we take into account maternity and 
parental leave, and adoption and parental leave as aggregated periods of 
time. Thus, in our opinion, a 6-month period is too short to guarantee the 
appropriate accommodation of the annual leave of workers on maternity, 
parental or adoption leave, especially when we take into account that 
their employer at the same time has to keep in mind the organisation of 
the work process and plan the annual leave of other workers. Besides 
this, maternity and parental leave on the grounds of the birth or adop-
tion of a child are periods of leave recognised by EU law.125 The taking of 
122 Zakon o obveznom zdravstvenom osiguranju (Obligatory Health Insurance Act), Narodne 
novine (Official Gazette) 80/13, 137/13, arts 48(2), 52(1). 
123 MPBA, arts 12(1) (maternity leave), 36(1) (adoption leave).
124 MPBA, arts 14 (parental leave), 36(3) (parental leave for adoptive parents). 
125 Directive 92/85/EEC (n 53) (maternity leave). Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 
2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by 
BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC (Text 
with EEA relevance) [2010] OJ L68/13 (parental leave on the grounds of birth or adoption 
of a child).
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one of these periods of leave to the detriment of paid annual leave would 
be, in itself, contrary to EU law.126 However, a carry-over period of longer 
duration would by no means provide the employer with the necessary 
flexibility and safeguard the workers’ right to paid annual leave. 
A similar line of argument can be used with regard to workers who 
fall into the category of ‘ordinary workers’ who also benefit from the 
6-month carry-over period. As has been demonstrated in section 3, Croa-
tian law recognises different types of paid and unpaid leave which are not 
recognised by EU law and which have not been discussed by the CJEU. 
Workers wishing to carry over their annual leave fall under the category 
of ‘ordinary workers’ who can carry only two weeks of annual leave for-
ward to the next year and who are in that respect in an even worse posi-
tion than workers on sick, maternity, parental or adoption leave. If the 
presumption made in section 3 is true that paid annual leave has to be 
accommodated with other types of paid and unpaid leave unrecognised 
by EU law but known to Croatian law, we find that the carry-over period 
of 6 months is not long enough to enable the effective realisation of the 
paid annual leave. In addition, in the case of the overlap of paid annual 
leave and other types of paid and unpaid leave known to Croatian law, 
we find that ‘ordinary workers’ must also be in a position to take full paid 
annual leave in the carry-over period. 
Finally, we raise doubts as to the duration of the carry-over period 
of the most privileged group of workers: members of a ship’s crew, posted 
workers and workers who have performed civil defence duty, who can 
take their full paid annual leave in the following year. If we follow the 
same line of argument as the Court used in KHS and Neidel, we find the 
one-year carry-over period to be still too short to safeguard the right to 
paid annual leave in the case of its overlap with any other type of leave, 
since in the aforementioned cases the CJEU demanded the carry-over 
period be substantially longer than the reference period of one calendar 
year.
5. Concluding remarks
In this article, we have examined three aspects of Croatian legis-
lation regarding paid annual leave which raise doubts concerning the 
proper implementation of Article 7 WTD. In these concluding remarks, 
we shall introduce our suggestions on how to bring Croatian law into 
conformity with EU law. 
In section 2, we examined the regulation on minimum periods of em-
ployment as a precondition for the entitlement to paid annual leave. We 
126 Federatie Nederlandse Vakebeweiging (n 97) para 24.
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showed how Article 59(2) LA, according to which ‘at least one half of a 
month of work is rounded up to a whole month [of work]’, leads to the 
exclusion of any work shorter than half a month from the calculation of 
paid annual leave. We also demonstrated that this exclusionary effect of 
Article 59(2) LA cannot be justified from the position of the relevant CJEU 
case law. As Article 7 WTD has direct effect, in vertical situations it will be 
necessary to set aside this national provision to give full effect to Article 
7 WTD. In horizontal situations, this discrepancy between national law 
and EU law can be resolved at the level of interpretation of the overall 
rules on the calculation of proportional time. Namely, the rule in Article 
59(2) LA can be interpreted in a way that less than half a month of work 
is rounded up to a half a month of work. In this way, keeping in mind the 
mathematical formula for the calculation of the proportional time of paid 
annual leave (X/12 x (WDPW x 4) = rounded days of paid annual leave), 
workers who work less than a half of a month on the basis of 3 to 5 days 
a week will have one day of paid annual leave.127 Workers who work less 
than 3 days a week would have half a day of paid annual leave.128 In our 
opinion, this interpretation of Article 59(2) LA would be in conformity 
with Article 7 WTD and would not go against national rules on the calcu-
lation of the proportional time of paid annual leave.
Section 3 was devoted to the relationship between paid annual leave 
and other periods of leave with regard to its first two strands, i.e. the 
question of whether the right to paid annual leave accrues during other 
periods of leave, and the issue of whether other periods of leave consume 
accrued but untaken paid annual leave. Regarding maternity, parental, 
adoption and sick leave, we have demonstrated that national legislation 
does not pose any particular problem from the standpoint of EU law. 
These types of leave are not calculated in annual leave, and annual leave 
does not stop accruing during these types of leave. The same conclusion 
has been reached with regard to paid leave for the important personal 
reasons, work-related education, and one free day for blood donors envis-
aged by the LA. In addition, already accrued paid annual leave cannot be 
consumed either by the unpaid leave for unspecified purposes mentioned 
in Article 66 LA or by the unpaid leave for the purposes of child care en-
visaged by Articles 22 and 23 MPBA. However, during these three types 
of leave, we are of the opinion that paid annual leave does not accrue 
under national law. Acknowledging that the ultimate say should be left to 
127 To recall, this is because Article 59(2) LA states that at least half of a day of annual leave 
is rounded up to a whole day of leave. The calculation on the basis of 3 days of work per 
week is: 0.5/12 x 3 x 4 = 0.5. The calculation on the basis of 5 days of work per week is: 
0.5/12 x 5 x 4 = 0.83. Both calculations give 1 day of paid annual leave.
128 The calculation on the basis of 2 days of work per week is: 0.5/12 x 2 x 4 = 0.33, which 
is less than half a day of annual leave. Therefore, this worker would have half a day of paid 
annual leave.
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the CJEU on whether this non-accrual of the right to paid annual leave 
is in accordance with EU law, we believe the following: the non-accrual 
of paid annual leave during Article 66 LA unpaid leave for unspecified 
purposes is not in conflict with Article 7 WTD, because this leave can be 
used for rest and pleasure and is thus comparable to ‘zero-hours short 
time working’ in Heimann and Toltschin. However, we raise doubts as to 
whether the non-accrual of paid annual leave during Article 22 and Ar-
ticle 23 MPBA unpaid leave represents the proper application of Article 
7 WTD, since the purpose cannot be comparable to the purpose of paid 
annual leave. 
Finally, in section 4 we analysed national provisions on the carry-
over period, examining the issue of its existence and length. We concluded 
that the LA recognises three categories of workers. ‘Ordinary workers’ who 
fall into the first category can only carry over two weeks of paid annual 
leave, which have to be used by 30 June of the following year. The second 
category encompasses workers on sick, maternity, parental or adoption 
leave, who can use all untaken paid annual leave until the aforemen-
tioned date. The most privileged category are members of a ship’s crew, 
posted workers and workers who have performed civil defence duty, who 
can carry over all untaken paid annual leave until 31 December of the 
following year. We concluded that the length of the carry-over period is 
disputable from the position of EU law with regard to all three categories 
when paid annual leave has been interrupted by other periods of leave. 
Since the CJEU’s interpretation that the carry-over period in the case of 
sick leave has to be substantially longer than the reference period (which 
in Croatian law amounts to one calendar year), neither a six-month nor 
a one-year carry-over period is long enough to accommodate the untaken 
paid annual leave. Thus, with regard to sick leave, in vertical situations 
the national judge should set aside the conflicting provisions of the LA 
and determine a longer duration of the carry-over period, which in our 
opinion, due to the judgment in KHS, does not have to go over 15 months 
following the year for which it was accrued. In horizontal situations, we 
hold that a conforming interpretation is not possible due to the precise-
ness of national legislation. Namely, we find it difficult to see how the 
stipulations of ‘until 30 June / 31 December of the following year’ can 
be interpreted in any other way than what they state. In horizontal situ-
ations, however, workers on sick leave have the option of claiming dam-
ages from the State for the improper implementation of Article 7 WTD. 
Turning to periods of leave other than sick leave, it is important to state 
that the CJEU has not had the opportunity to express itself regarding 
national provisions on the exact length of the carry-over period of ma-
ternity, parental, adoption or any other leave. Therefore, we think that 
national judges should primarily seek the answer from the CJEU through 
the mechanism of the preliminary reference procedure. In our opinion, a 
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six-month period is not long enough to accommodate maternity, parental 
or adoption leave and we see no reason why the CJEU would not in this 
matter follow its line of reasoning developed with regard to sick leave in 
Neidel and KHS. We reach the same conclusion with regard to the carry-
over period of paid annual leave in the case of overlap with all paid and 
unpaid leave envisaged by the LA and MPBA. This equally applies to the 
one-year carry-over for workers who are members of a ship’s crew, posted 
workers or workers who have performed civil defence duty, as it is not 
substantially longer than the one-year reference period it refers to. 
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